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Scarcely a decade ago, a conference of this sort would have been more
than an anomaly; it would have been presumptuous. If it took place at all, the
speakers would have solemnly examined the grotesque crypto-constitutions of
an assortment of totalitarianisms and authoritarianisms with a mixture of
scientific detachment and juridical respect owed to sovereign efforts at
political and economic self-determination. Consider how radically things have
changed. In the contemporary international arena, citizens of one national
community may concern themselves with, appraise, and even intervene in the
crafting and maintenance of constitutions in other communities. The core
constitutional principles of national communities are now legitimate matters
of international concern.
A growing body of evidence indicates that elites who are free from the
internal restraints of constitutional order are more prone to engage in foreign
mischief (quite apart from their wicked activities at home) than are elites
subject to democratic constitutional controls. Constitutional democracies, as
Professor Russett has shown,' do not initiate wars against one another.
International peace will always be in jeopardy in a world in which some states
do not have effective democratic constitutions. Civil and political rights may
be proclaimed in international fora, but such proclamations are meaningless
if they are not implemented at the national level. Constitutionally protected
civil and political rights within states, although usually thought of as
quintessentially domestic concerns, serve a critical role in the maintenance of
international peace.
Constitutional principles also ensure a flourishing economy. Modern
democracies need vigorous and productive economies, as well as a system of
free trade among those economies in which all benefit from diverse competi-
tive advantages. This system, however, requires a level playing field. The
international economic system cannot operate efficiently when economic and
social rights are available in some economies and not in others. Economic,
social, and cultural rights can be proclaimed at the international level. Like
civil and political rights, however, they are meaningless if they are not
implemented at the national level. Constitutionally protected economic and
social rights are also critical to the maintenance of a stable international order.
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These developments have far-reaching implications. It is not simply that
certain human rights have become, as Professor Thomas Franck has written,
international entitlements.' We have unwittingly reached the point where
international legal standards require states to have appropriate national
constitutions. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 and the Interna-
tional Covenants4 necessarily imply a right to an appropriate constitution. In
some parts of the world, elites still resist this development. With the economic
decline and political disintegration of many totalitarian and authoritarian
governments, however, many new elites have identified what is often referred
to as "constitution building" as a critical, and sometimes even primary, part
of the task of national reconstruction. Many scholars and policymakers in the
United States concur. Yet we are not always speaking about the same things.
The term "constitution building" is somewhat misleading. At every level
of social organization, there exists a constitutive process through which elites
establish, maintain, and change the institutions indispensable for the
performance of all of society's critical decision functions.5 One can no more
escape this process than one can build a house while ignoring the most basic
laws of physics.
Modern constitution building is an internationally inspired part of national
constitutive processes. It aspires to adapt particular domestic constitutive
processes in ways that balance effectiveness with the internationally demanded
principles of human rights associated with advanced democracies. It seeks to
incorporate into critical phases of the constitutive process those compacts
between the governed and the governors that establish how power is to be
used. It focuses on the use of power, not simply in formal arenas, but in
every sector of society, from the market to relations between genders and
among generations. And, by incorporating various control mechanisms, it
seeks to ensure the effectiveness of those compacts that establish how and for
what purposes power is to be used.
Experience has alerted those involved in this process to numerous caveats.
Let me select from them ten working principles for review.
1. Those assisting in the development of constitutions cannot simply
cathect to a "favorite" constitution and try to replicate it elsewhere. Functions
can be adjusted to different contexts, but constitutions, as a whole, do not
travel.
2. In crossing boundaries, framers must emphasize functions and not
specific institutional implementations of functions. For example, control
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mechanisms are critical in constitutional regimes; no constitution can be
conceived without them. Judicial review is one institutional implementation of
a control mechanism. It may be cogent in one constitutional context, the
United States, but make no sense at all in another, the United Nations.
3. In designing constitutions, framers must account for the actual
distribution of power.
4. Framers must design a constitution to reflect a community's particular
historical and political context.
5. The experiences of nineteenth-century Latin America and twentieth-
century Africa demonstrate that the great constitutions of the eighteenth-
century cannot simply be copied on the assumption that they will miraculously
transform a political system into a constitutional democracy. Designing
constitutions is more than a paper exercise.
6. It is also more than a narrow political exercise. Framers of constitu-
tions cannot simply focus on political institutions. Nor is it enough to add the
market. They must consider all value processes in constitutional design and
revision.
7. Effective and operational constitutions require what Professor Lung-chu
Chen calls the development of "constitutional cultures. "6 These must be
propagated in revised law school curricula, in the media, and in miranda and
folklore.
8. Because constitutions must create institutions, framers cannot simply
focus on the classic branches or organs of government (i.e., the legislature,
the executive, and the judiciary). They must consider and plan for all seven
decision functions: intelligence, recommendation, prescription, invocation,
application, appraisal, and termination.7 In each context, the operative
question is how well a particular constitutional arrangement can facilitate the
performance of those functions.
9. Framers cannot simply focus on a single community. Democratic
constitutions in one state require provisions for the maintenance of regional
stability, which, in turn, requires international stability.
10. Where the internal balance of forces is unstable and undermines
indigenous efforts to install a constitutional regime, outside intervention may
be required. But who can trust intervenors? Happily, a range of regional and
international institutions, applying the great human rights instruments, can
now provide some of the important external controls that modern democratic
constitutions need.
These working principles indicate that building or revising constitutions
means orchestrating comprehensive social change. It is a daunting task, but
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it can be accomplished. This Symposium promises to cover most of these
matters. As an internationalist, I might be permitted to quarrel gently with the
organizers on one point. They have focused only on the explicitly national
dimensions of current constitutional challenges. Curiously, they overlook
certain critical transnational constitutional crises in Western Europe after the
Maastricht Summit,' and in the United Nations, as the Permanent Members
of the Security Council confront more than 180 other governments who yearn,
at the international level, for some of the guarantees of a Rechtsstaat.9 In an
integrated and interdependent world, such transnational constitutional
developments cannot but affect national constitution building.
I congratulate the students who have organized this timely and important
conference and am grateful for the invitation to introduce it.
8. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247.
9. See generally W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 83 (1993).
